Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys – what does this mean for advocacy?

What does Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) mean for advocacy? The short answer is: nothing. And I do not mean that just in the sense that Mazur was only meant to clarify the existing law as opposed to creating new law.

Mazur was concerned with the discrete issue of the “conduct of litigation”. The Legal Services Act 2007 identifies the “conduct of litigation” as being a reserved legal activity. Advocacy is also a reserved legal activity under the Act. Mazur held that unauthorised individuals cannot conduct litigation even if supervised by an authorised individual. However, the LSA has different provisions when it comes to advocacy. In particular, Schedule 3 of the LSA lists various exempt persons (meaning individuals who can, in certain circumstances, undertake advocacy) including:

“(7) The person is exempt if —

(a) the person is an individual whose work includes assisting in the conduct of litigation,

(b) the person is assisting in the conduct of litigation —

(i) under instructions given (either generally or in relation to the proceedings) by an individual to whom sub-paragraph (8) applies, and

(ii) under the supervision of that individual, and

(c) the proceedings are not reserved family proceedings and are being heard in chambers —

(i) in the High Court or county court, or

(ii) in the family court by a judge who is not, or by two or more judges at least one of whom is not, within section 31C(1)(y) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (lay justices).”

Therefore, subject to the various requirements being met, an unauthorised fee earner can undertake advocacy in chambers under supervision from an authorised fee earner.

There is still a certain amount of unpacking to do here.

The use of the phrase “in chambers” is unfortunate and has caused confusion in the past, even for some members of the judiciary. Part of the problem stems from the fact that the terms is not defined within the LSA. The term “in chambers” should not be confused with “in private”. Most hearings that are “in chambers” are also open to the public (even if it is sometimes necessary to get past locked doors to get to the hearing room). Classic examples of hearings being in chambers would includes CMCs, interim applications and detailed assessment hearings. For those wanting a more in-depth analysis, I have written about this topic extensively in the past and there is nothing within Mazur that alters anything:

Rights of audience of law costs draftsmen – Part 1

Rights of audience of law costs draftsmen – Part 2

“Rights of audience myth” myth

The real rights of audience “myth”

Rights of audience at detailed assessment

However, there are two issues with the wording of the exemption that are worth considering further. So far as I am aware, there are no reported decisions on how the relevant wording should be interpreted.

Firstly, it is a requirement that the unauthorised individual is “assisting in the conduct of litigation”. What does this mean? Is it sufficient that they are undertaking the advocacy or is something more required? Is the assistance a prerequisite to then be permitted to undertake the advocacy? For example, if an unauthorised fee earner is instructed to paginate a hearing bundle and attend the hearing, does the act of paginating the bundle constitute “assisting in the conduct of litigation” thus creating a doorway to being able to undertake the advocacy? If the same fee earner is only instructed to attend the hearing, have they failed to overcome the initial part of the test? It would be an extremely odd outcome if that is the correct interpretation (with a preliminary act, however minor, constituting the “assisting”) but that is how it reads on a literal reading.

Secondly, the assistance must be “under the supervision of that individual”. What form must this “supervision” take in the context of advocacy? It cannot have been the intention that there is a requirement for the authorised individual giving the instructions to physically attend the hearing to supervise what the unauthorised fee earner is saying in court. On the other hand, it must mean something. If, for example, a team leader in a personal injury department, who is themselves an authorised person, instructs an unauthorised fee earner in their department to attend a CMC, this would presumably satisfy the requirement of supervision in their role as team leader. However, what about instructing an unauthorised fee earner in a separate advocacy department? How would the supervision be evidenced? Equally, is it possible to instruct an external advocacy provider (of unauthorised staff) to undertake the advocacy and still be able to establish “supervision”?

Neither of these issues arise because of Mazur. They are unresolved issues embedded in the LSA.