Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys – Wrongly decided? – Part 2

One of the arguments advanced as to why Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) may have been wrongly decided comes from Jackson Yamba,  a registered foreign lawyer at Halifax firm SAZ Solicitors, via LinkedIn:

“Why Mazur is Wrong on Exempt Persons under the Legal Services Act 2007

Mazur’s interpretation of exempt persons under the Legal Services Act 2007 doesn’t hold up.

Schedule 3, para 2 makes it clear: an exempt person is someone who, though not authorised, has been granted permission “by or under an enactment” to carry on a reserved legal activity.

The Civil Procedure Act 1997 and the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) are such enactments. Importantly, CPR 2.3 defines a legal representative broadly — including not just solicitors and barristers, but also employees.

That means employees conducting litigation under the CPR are recognised as legal representatives and therefore fall within the statutory definition of exempt persons.

Mazur’s argument misses this crucial point: the interaction between the LSA 2007 and the CPR clearly gives employees standing to act. Ignoring this framework leads to a legally unsustainable conclusion.”

Let us examine that.

The relevant part of Schedule 3, para 2 reads:

“(1) This paragraph applies to determine whether a person is an exempt person for the purpose of carrying on any activity which constitutes the conduct of litigation in relation to any proceedings (subject to paragraph 7).

…

(3) The person is exempt if the person—

(a) is not an authorised person in relation to that activity, but

(b) has a right to conduct litigation in relation to those proceedings granted by or under any enactment.”

The relevant part of CPR 2.3 reads:

“‘legal representative’ means a –

(a) barrister;

(b) solicitor;

(c) solicitor’s employee;

(d) manager of a body recognised under section 9 of the Administration of Justice Act 1985; or

(e) person who, for the purposes of the Legal Services Act 2007, is an authorised person in relation to an activity which constitutes the conduct of litigation (within the meaning of that Act),

who has been instructed to act for a party in relation to proceedings;”

Interestingly, the Legal Services Act 2007 itself uses the term “legal representative” in the body of the act only in relation to pro bono work. Otherwise, it only occurs in those sections making consequential amendments to other acts (e.g. the Children and Young Persons Act 1933). In that context, it defines “legal representative” as:

“‘legal representative’ means a person who, for the purposes of the Legal Services Act 2007, is an authorised person in relation to an activity which constitutes the exercise of a right of audience or the conduct of litigation (within the meaning of that Act);”

It is not at all clear that the use of the term “legal representative” in the CPR can be used as an aid to interpret the Legal Services Act 2007 (or vice versa).

In any event, to be exempt under Schedule 3 of the Legal Services Act 2007, the CPR would need to grant the “solicitor’s employee” “a right to conduct litigation in relation to those proceedings”. The only relevant right granted by the CPR appears to be CPR 22 which permits a Statement of Truth to be signed by a “legal representative”. Even if we accept for the purposes of Mazur that the signing of a Statement of Truth amounts to the conduct of litigation, and that a combination of the definition in CPR 2.3 together with CPR 22 permits a “solicitor’s employee” to undertake this task, it is a difficult stretch to see how this therefore also permits the “solicitor’s employee” to undertake any other step that might amount to the conduct of litigation.

Mazur may be wrong, but not as a consequence of this line of argument.